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Abstract 
A new cognitive architecture for artificial vision is proposed. The architecture, aimed at an 
autonomous intelligent system, is cognitive in the sense that several cognitive hypotheses have been 
postulated as guidelines for its design. The first one is the existence of a conceptual representation 
level between the subsymbolic level, that processes ensory data, and the linguistic level, that 
describes scenes by means of a high level language. The conceptual level plays the role of 
the interpretation domain for the symbols at the linguistic levels. A second cognitive hypothesis 
concerns the active role of a focus of attention mechanism in the link between the conceptual 
and the linguistic level: the exploration process of the perceived scene is driven by linguistic and 
associative expectations. This link is modeled as a time delay attractor neural network. Results 
are reported obtained by an experimental implementation of the architecture. 
Keywords: Perception; Active vision; Robotics; Conceptual spaces; Spatial reasoning; Geometric reasoning; 
Representation levels; Hybrid processing 
1. Introduction 
An artificial vision system for an autonomous agent must be able to build a rich 
internal representation of the external environment. Such internal representation should 
allow the system to effectively draw inferences, make decisions, and, in general, perform 
reasoning processes concerning its own tasks [ 4,3 11. 
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In classical reasoning systems oriented to logic, the meaning of symbols is given 
by relating them to abstract entities according to model-theoretic semantics. This turns 
out to be incomplete for an autonomous agent, since it needs to find the meaning for 
its symbols within its internal representation and in its interaction with the external 
world, thus overcoming the well-known symbol grounding problem, as discussed in 
Harnad [ 361. 
We present a cognitive architecture for an artificial vision system, in which an effective 
internal representation of the environment is built by means of processes defined over a 
suitable intermediate level, that acts as an intermediary between the sensory data and the 
symbolic level. This architecture is not to be considered as a model of human vision: 
no hypotheses are made concerning its empirical adequacy from a psychological point 
of view. However, various cognitive results have been used as sources of inspiration. 
According to Marr’s model [ 471, visual perception is modeled as a process in which 
information and knowledge are represented and processed at different levels of ab- 
straction, from the lowest level, directly related to features of proximal stimuli, to the 
highest one, where knowledge about the perceived objects is of a symbolic nature. 
Following Marr’s seminal work, research in computer vision has exploded, becoming 
itself a discipline which has provided many working paradigms for object reconstruc- 
tion and recognition from sensory data (see Besl and Jain [ 111, Chin and Dyer [ 241, 
Bindford [ 141 for a review). 
A general implicit assumption of research in computer vision has been that the vision 
process ends with the 3D reconstruction of shapes by means of some suitable geometric 
primitives, as for instance, Marr’s generalized cylinders [ 471. Models of reasoning about 
the structure of the reconstructed objects have been proposed only for very special 
purpose recognition systems (see, e.g., the ACRONYM system [ 19,201 or the ALVEN 
system [ 631). In the artificial intelligence community, on the other hand, there has 
been growing interest in spatial reasoning for planning activities of situated agents in a 
physical environment [ 11, and for man-machine interaction [44]. But research in this 
field has failed to result in an effective interaction with the real world environment by 
means of a working vision system. 
The architecture proposed here aims at providing a general vision model for an 
autonomous agent, that fills a gap between these lines of research by means of a 
paradigm according to which a reconstructed geometrical scene can be described in 
symbolic linguistic terms. It also provides a context which can be useful for active 
vision tasks, as described by Bajcsy [ 51 and Ballard [ 71. This linguistic description 
should, however, be considered as a first level that is nevertheless sufficient to ground 
successively higher symbolic reasoning activities. 
The three cognitive representation levels proposed by Gardenfors [ 331 are the basis 
of our architectural design: the subsymbolic level, in which the information is strictly 
related to sensory data; the linguistic level, in which information is expressed by a 
symbolic language; and an intermediate, prelinguistic conceptual level, where the infor- 
mation is characterized in terms of a metric space defined by a number of cognitive 
dimensions, independent of any specific language. This level aims at generating the 
essential representation of the agent’s external environment and at providing a precise 
interpretation of the linguistic level. 
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The interpretation of the conceptual categories at the linguistic level involves some 
well-known problems. For instance, perceptual common sense concepts hardly cor- 
respond to clear cut, classic categories which can be described in terms of neces- 
sary and sufficient conditions. Membership in perceptive categories is not an all-or- 
nothing affair: it is usually necessary, for example, to consider a prototype of the 
category. Moreover, the available information depends strictly on the data acquired 
through measurement processes. As a consequence, knowledge at the conceptual level 
is affected by measurement errors. A way of facing these problems is to model 
the mapping between the conceptual and the linguistic levels in terms of a connec- 
tionist device. Neural networks make it possible to avoid an exhaustive description 
of conceptual categories at the symbolic level: in some sense, prototypes “emerge” 
from the activity of an associative mechanism during a training phase based on ex- 
amples. In addition, the measure of similarity between a prototype and a given ob- 
ject is implicit in the behavior of the network and is determined during the learning 
phase. 
A further cognitive aspect is the role of attention processes in the link between the 
linguistic and the conceptual level. A finite agent with bounded resources cannot carry 
out a one shot, exhaustive, and uniform analysis of a perceived scene within reasonable 
time constraints. Furthermore, some aspects of a scene are more relevant than others, 
and it would be irrational to waste time and computational resources to detect true but 
useless details. We face these problems by a sequential attention mechanism, which 
suitably scans the internal representation of the scene. Also the order in which the 
objects in the scene are analyzed can be relevant (and, obviously, it becomes crucial in 
the case of the perception of dynamic scenes). Our model drives the focus ofuattentian 
by the knowledge, the hypotheses, the purposes and the expectations of the system, in 
order to detect the relevant aspects in the perceived scene. Hence, it is a task of the 
higher level components to use the information acquired through the perceptual system 
to create expectations or to form contexts in which hypotheses can be verified and, if 
necessary, adjusted. The link between the linguistic and the conceptual level is therefore 
bidirectional: the conceptual level defines the interpretation domain for the symbols at 
the linguistic level, and the linguistic level generates expectations in order to explore the 
conceptual level suitably. Three focus of attention modes are the basis of the proposed 
architecture: a reactive mode, in which attention is driven only by the characteristics of 
scene, a linguistic mode in which attention is driven by simple inferences at the linguistic 
level, and an associative mode in which attention is driven by free associations among 
concepts. 
In summary, we extend further and complete the representation levels proposed by 
Marr, by adding a conceptual and a linguistic level, where understanding takes place. 
Moreover, the introduced focus of attention provides a systematic and general interaction 
mechanism among levels, and extends also the active vision paradigm to higher cog- 
nitive levels. As a consequence, the limitations of special purpose goal oriented vision 
systems like ACRONYM and ALVEN, or the more recent systems like TEA- 1 [ 561 and 
BUSTER [ 151, are overcome by means of a framework in which general understanding 
of visual information is modeled in a well-founded manner, and specific goals can be 
easily expressed. 
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We are aware of the typical, “hard” and not yet solved problems encountered in real 
scenes at low level vision, as shadows, poor contrast, occluding objects, segmentation 
criteria; in Section 9 we will discuss how our architectural design is a contribution 
towards possible and unexplored solutions. 
In the following sections we present the architecture in a detailed manner, also pro- 
viding simple experimental results aimed at illustrating the functioning of the various 
components. It should be noted that also with the adopted reduced experimental setup 
at the low level, that provides only essential information about scenes, the architecture 
is able to draw many inferences and to build a rich interpretation context. Specifically, 
Section 2 delineates the design of the architecture based on the previously exposed 
principles; Section 3 describes the three levels of representation, while Sections 4 and 
5 respectively specify the linguistic level and its interpretation function. Section 6 ex- 
amines in greater detail the focus of attention mechanism, and Section 7 characterizes 
the link between the conceptual and the linguistic level in terms of time delay attractor 
neural networks. Finally, Section 8 describes the employed experimental setup and the 
obtained results, and Section 9 presents some concluding remarks and hints on future 
work. 
2. The cognitive architecture 
The cognitive assumptions introduced in the previous section provide the guidelines 
for the design and implementation of the proposed architecture for artificial vision, The 
current implementation concerns the analysis of static scenes. Fig. 1 shows the overall 
architecture in which the previously described three levels of representation are pointed 
out. 
Block A is the starting block of the subsymbolic level: it receives one or more 
input pictorial digitized images acquired by a camera and it gives as output the Mat-r’s 
2iD description [47] of the input image. This contains information similar to the 
intrinsic images proposed by Tenenbaum, Fischler and Barrow [59] and by Barrow and 
Tenenbaum [ 91, such as relative depth, local orientation and segmentation maps. Several 
algorithms and methodologies have been proposed in the computer vision literature to 
extract this information from the pictorial images (see Bertero, Poggio and Torre [ lo], 
Lee [45], Aloimonos [2] for a review). 
The maps extracted by block A are sent as input to block B, which builds, at the 
conceptual level, a scene description in terms of a combination of 3D geometric primi- 
tives. Several types of 3D primitives have been proposed to generate an object centered 
description of the scene, like generalized cylinders and cones [ 20,5 11, geons [ 12,261, 
superquadrics [ 8,52,57] and deformed superquadrics [ 53,60,61]. Such primitives can 
be recovered by many proposed reconstruction methods, which are based mainly on the 
iterative minimization of suitable nonlinear error functions (see Bolle and Vemuri [ 171) . 
Block C implements the mapping between the conceptual level and the symbolic 
level; this block aims at recognizing the objects and the situations. The input to block C 
is a structure at the conceptual level, its output is sent to the linguistic level to produce 
a sentential description of the scene. The symbolic knowledge base is the kernel of the 
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Fig. I. The proposed architecture in which the three levels of representation are pointed out. Block A receives 
the input from a camera and gives as output the 2tD map images. The maps are sent to block B, which builds 
a scene description in terms of a combination of 3D geometric primitives. Block C implements the mapping 
between the conceptual level and the symbolic level. Block D implements the linguistic mode of the focus of 
attention mechanism, while block E implements the associative mode of the focus of attention. 
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linguistic level. The aim of this block is twofold: it describes in a high level language 
the perceived scene by interpreting the input coming from block C, and it generates, 
by means of its inference capabilities, the expectations that drive the focus of attention 
mechanism. 
Block D is responsible for the linguistic mode of the focus of attention mechanism. 
It receives as input the instances of concepts from the knowledge base and it suitably 
drives the focus of attention, in order to seek the corresponding objects and situations 
in the acquired scene. Block E is responsible for the associative mode of the focus 
of attention. Its operation is similar to block D, but it drives the focus of attention 
by looking for the objects in the scene which can be freely associated with the input 
instances. The reactive mode of the focus of attention is implemented as an internal 
mechanism of block D: when the block does not receive any expectations as input, 
it generates some generic expectations in order to “bootstrap” the operation of the 
system. 
3. The levels of representation 
According to Marr’s model [47], visual perception is described as an information 
processing activity at different levels of abstraction. At higher levels visual information 
is object centered and is related to the 3D characteristics of the scene. In Marr’s 
theory a superior symbolic level is limited to a hierarchically organized catalogue of 3D 
prototypes. 
It has been introduced in the mental imagery literature (see Block [ 161) the dis- 
tinction between mental pictures and propositional mental representations: e.g., Koss- 
lyn [43] distinguishes between a short term memory based on mental images, and a 
propositional long term memory: mental images can be generated and processed starting 
from the propositional long term information. It has been discussed whether mental 
images are viewer centered or object centered representations, that is, whether a mental 
image depends on the specific observation point or not. Cognitive evidence exists ac- 
cording to which both these kinds of representation coexist and are integrated in human 
memory, as described by Tarr and Pinker [58] and by Farah, Hammond, Levine and 
Calvanio [ 291. 
In the Johnson-Laird theory [ 391, three levels of representation are hypothesized, that, 
in some sense, summarize the various points of view sketched above. The “highest” level 
is a propositional representation, i.e., a symbolic representation similar, for example, to 
a semantic network. The intermediate representation is a mental model, in some respects 
analogous to an object centered (or spatial) mental image. The “lowest” level is a visual, 
viewer centered, mental image. 
From a slightly different point of view, Gardenfors [ 331 proposes three levels of 
information representation: a linguistic level, a conceptual level and a subsymbolic level. 
At the linguistic level the information is described in terms of a symbolic language, e.g., 
a first order language; at the subsymbolic level information is characterized directly in 
terms of the perceptual inputs of the system. Between these two levels, a third level 
is hypothesized: the conceptual level, in which information is described in terms of a 
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conceptual space. Our model is inspired by the three representation levels proposed by 
Gardenfors. The theory of conceptual spaces provides a robust cognitive background 
for the definition of the internal representations of the agent’s external environment. 
Furthermore, this framework may easily be generalized to incorporate well-founded 
attentional mechanisms, as we will show in Section 6. Further analogies can be found 
between the model proposed here and the one proposed by Man; as well as the models 
that have emerged from the mental imagery debate. 
In Fig. 1, the three gray blocks correspond to Gardenfors’ levels of representation. 
The first level can also be seen as a visual, viewer centered, mental image (or, in 
Marr’s terminology, a 2iD sketch). The central level embeds within itself an object 
centered mental image (in Marr’s terminology, a 3D model representation). The upper 
level consists of a propositional, linguistic, knowledge representation. Such a level can 
be assimilated to Kosslyn’s long term memory and to Marr’s hierarchical catalogue of 
models. 
According to Gardenfors, a conceptual space is a metric space consisting of a num- 
ber of quality dimensions. From a formal point of view, a conceptual space is an 
n-dimensional space CS where Xi is the set of values of the ith quality dimension (for 
1 < i 6 n with n E IV). Examples of such dimensions would be color, pitch, mass, 
spatial coordinates, and so on. The dimensions should be considered “cognitive” in that 
they correspond to qualities of the represented environment, without reference to any 
linguistic descriptions. In this sense, a conceptual space is prior to any symbolic charac- 
terization of cognitive phenomena. Some dimensions in a conceptual space are closely 
linked to the sensorial input of the system, other dimensions can be related to more 
abstract concepts. 
We call knoxel 3 a generic point in a conceptual space (the term is suggested 
by the analogy with the term pixel in digital image processing); knoxels therefore 
represent epistemological primitives at the considered level of analysis. Formally, a 
knoxel is a vector k = (XI, x2,. . . , x, ) where Xi E Xi corresponds to a parame- 
ter associated with a quality dimension of the domain of interest. In our architec- 
ture, the dimensions of the conceptual space are the parameters of the 3D geomet- 
ric primitives which compose the scene. In this perspective, the knoxels correspond 
to simple geometric building blocks, while complex objects or situations are repre- 
sented as suitable sets of knoxels. Accordingly, each knoxel is related to measurements, 
obtained via suitable sensors, of the geometric parameters of simple, basic objects 
in the external environment. A metric function d is defined in CS, which may be 
considered as a measure of similarity among knoxels in the conceptual space (see 
GLdenfors [ 321) . 
In general terms, a precise characterization of the conceptual space poses some prob- 
lems. This is the case, in particular, when one has to take into account the qualitative 
difference in the information being represented in each dimension. It is, for instance, a 
complex task to find a metric that allows for a suitable quantization of the interesting 
features. Gardenfors [34] notes that: 
3 The term knoxel was first introduced by Gaglio, Puliafito, Paolucci and Perotto I 30 1 with a slightly different 
meaning. 
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The main factor preventing a rapid development of a cognitive semantics based on 
conceptual spaces is the lack of knowledge about the relevant quality dimensions. 
It is almost only for perceptual dimensions that psychophysical research has suc- 
ceeded in identifying the underlying topological structures (and, in rare cases, the 
psychological metric). For example, we only have a very sketchy understanding 
of how we perceive and conceptualize things according to their shapes. The mod- 
els developed by Marr and Nishihara [ 481, Pentland [ 521, Biederman [ 131, and 
Tversky and Hemenway [65] among others, seem to point in the right direction, 
but there still remains a lot to learn about the “shape space”. 
Nevertheless, we claim that our architecture overcomes these problems since we 
have adopted a very simple (but nonetheless useful) conceptual space in which the 
dimensions correspond to the parameters of suitable 3D geometric primitives. Their 
boolean composition, according to schemas of constructive solid geometry (CSG) 4 as 
described by Requicha [55], permits the representation of a great variety of familiar 
shapes, particularly those corresponding to human artifacts. We have found convenient 
to adopt the superquadn’cs as the geometric primitives of the CSG schema. They are 
widely used both in computer graphics [ 81 and computer vision [ 52,57,66] as they 
offer an acceptable compromise between the compression of information in the scene 
and the necessary computational costs [ 46,571. Furthermore, superquadrics provide 
good expressive power and representational adequacy [ 521. 
Solina and Bajcsy [ 571, Gupta and Bajcsy [ 351, Leonardis, Solina and Macerl [46], 
among others, have proposed working techniques for recovering superquadrics from real 
scenes, even when the objects are difficult to segment. Techniques aimed at the recovery 
of superquadrics, also in the presence of occlusions, have been proposed by Whaite and 
Ferrie [ 661 and by Maver and Bajcsy [49]. 
Superquadrics are geometric shapes derived from the quadrics parametric equation 
with the trigonometric functions raised to two real exponents. The inside/outside func- 
tion of the superquadric in implicit form is: 
F(x,y,z) = [(f-ye1 + (-yc2]e*‘e’ + (-y”‘, (1) 
where the parameters a,, a,, and a, are the lengths of the superquadric axes and the 
exponents ~1 and 82, called form factors, are responsible for the shape’s form: EI acts 
in terms of the longitude, and ~2 in terms of the latitude of the object’s surface. Pq. (1) 
returns a value equal to 1 when the point (x, y, z ) is a superquadric boundary point, a 
value less than 1 when it is an inside point, and a value greater than 1 when it is an 
outside point. Fig. 2 shows the forms assumed by a superquadric by varying only its 
form factors (~1, ~2). Form factors less than 1 let the superquadric take on a squared 
form, as in Fig. 2(a) where the values (O.Ol,O.Ol) result in a box shaped superquadric; 
values approaching 1 render the shape rounded, as in Fig. 2(b), where the form factors 
4 According to the CSG schema, the geometric primitives can be considered closed compact sets in Euclidean 
space, and they can be composed through regularized boolean operators (R-AND, R-OR, R-DIFF) to form 
general 3D structures. 
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Fig. 2. Aspects assumed by a superquadric by varying its form factors. 
( 1, 1) make the superquadric an ellipsoid. When the form factors are (0.01, l), the 
superquadric assumes a cylindrical shape (see Fig. 2(c) ). Finally, values greater than 
1, e.g., (5,5), tend to generate a cuspidate aspect, as in Fig. 2(d). 
The previous equation is the parametric equation in canonical form of a superellip- 
soid: the three center coordinates pX, pr , pz and the three orientation parameters ~,a, $ 
completely describe a generically displaced superquadric. The expression of the knoxel, 
describing a generic superquadric is therefore: 
k= (a,,a~,a,,el,E2,p,,p~,p7,~,~,ICI). (2) 
As an example, let us consider the sample scene in Fig. 3 representing a hammer, 
a computer mouse and a tennis ball. The knoxels are obtained by approximating each 
part of the scene by means of the best fitting superquadric (see Fig. 4) ; details on 
this operation performed by our experimental setup will be given in Section 8. Each 
superquadric has been indicated by a tag; the acquired scene is therefore described by 
the knoxels kl, kz, k3, and k4. 
As previously stated, a knoxel individuates a single superquadric; complex objects and 
situations are represented by suitable sets of superquadrics according to the CSG schema. 
It should be noted that the superquadric parameters also code the position and orientation 
of the superquadric in space: therefore the relative orientation and mutual position 
of the superquadrics describing a composite object, e.g., the hammer, are implicitly 
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Fig. 3. A sample scene representing a hammer, a computer mouse and a tennis ball. 
defined. There is no need of mechanisms such as the adjunct relations proposed by 
Mat-r [48]. 
We define a perception cluster pc = {kl , k2, . . . , kl} as a finite set of knoxels corre- 
sponding to an object or a situation in CS. Referring to Fig. 4, the perception cluster 
pet = {kl , kz} describes a hammer, while the perception cluster PC:! = {ks} describes a 
tennis ball. The set PC of all the perception clusters in CS is defined as: 
PC= {{k,,kz,. .., kl} 1 1 E N, ki E CS for 1 < i < 1). (3) 
The conceptual level is independent of any linguistic characterization. Indeed, the 
symbols at the linguistic level are interpreted on configurations at the conceptual level. 
A suitable interpretation function maps linguistic expressions onto conceptual structures 
of the appropriate type. In Section 5, we describe how this interpretation function may 
be “computed”. 
4. The linguistic level 
The role of the linguistic level is to provide a concise description of the perceived 
scene in terms of a high level logical language, in itself suitable for symbolic knowledge- 
based reasoning. In order to describe the symbolic knowledge base, we adopt a hybrid 
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Fig. 4. Results obtained by the superquadric approximation of the scene in Fig. 3. 
representation formalism, in the sense of Nebel [ 501. Accordingly, a hybrid formalism 
is constituted by two different modules: a terminological component and an assertional 
component. In our model, the terminological component contains the descriptions of the 
concepts relevant for the represented domain (e.g., types of objects and of situations to 
be perceived). The assertional component stores the assertions describing the specific 
perceived scenes. 
The distinction between terminological and assertional components is useful for main- 
taining the distinction between the conceptual knowledge, which is largely independent 
of the specific perceived scene, and the assertions concerning the scene itself. More- 
over, terminological formalisms are well suited to our purposes, in that they are cen- 
tered on conceptual descriptions. This allows for a compact description of concepts, 
whose instances are to be recognized in the perceived scene. The adopted formalism is 
completely monotonic (it is well known that in classic terminological system concept 
description in terms of default attributes is not allowed). Nonmonotonic extensions of 
the conceptual knowledge base would probably demonstrate themselves to be helpful in 
further developments of the system. Up to now, however, we have chosen to keep the 
symbolic knowledge base completely monotonic, in order that the prototypical charac- 
terization of concepts might emerge entirely from the properties of the conceptual level 
and from the associative mechanisms linking it to the linguistic level, as proposed by 
Gardenfors [ 321. 
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Fig. 5. Graphic description of a fragment of the terminological knowledge base. A generic Object is described 
as composed of at least one knoxel. A Simple-object is described as an object composed of exactly one 
knoxel; a Complex-object is an object composed of at least wo knoxels. Hummer is an example of a complex 
object. The role has-part has been differentiated into more distinct roles. The concept Hammer has two roles: 
has-bundle and has-head. 
As an example, consider in Fig. 5 a fragment of the terminological knowledge base 
concerning the description of objects. In the figure, the graphic notation developed by 
Brachman [ 181 for the KL-ONE system has been adopted. A generic Object is described 
as composed of at least one knoxel. A Simple-object is described as an object composed 
of exactly one knoxel; a Complex-object is an object composed of at least two knoxels. 
Hammer is an example of a complex object. The role has-part has been differentiated 
into more distinct roles. For example, the concept Hammer has two roles: a role has- 
handle with exactly one filler, which must be a knoxel with a cylindrical shape, and a 
role has-head with exactly one box shaped filler. 
The assertional component is based on a first order predicate language, in which 
the concepts of the terminological component correspond to one argument predicates, 
and the roles (e.g., has-head or has-handle) correspond to two argument relations. So, 
for example, in order to assert the existence of an instance Hammer#l of the concept 
Hammer, the formula 
Hammer( Hammer#l) 
is asserted. To express that the filler of the role has-handle for Hammer#l is a specific 
knoxel Cylinder-shaped#l, the formula 
has-handle(Hammer#l,Cylinder-shaped#l) 
is asserted. 
As far as situations are concerned, we choose to represent them as concepts in the 
terminological formalism. In other words, we assume that situations are reified, i.e., that 
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Fig. 6. Graphic description of the Situation concept. Every situation has at least one object as participant. 
Next-to and Above are described as particular types of situations, with exactly two participants. 
to every specific situation there corresponds an individual in the domain. This solution 
is analogous to Davidson’s proposal for event representation [25]. Since we have no 
philosophical worries of ontological parsimony, this choice turns out to be simpler 
and advantageous in many respects. It is well suited for terminological formalisms, 
and provides a great flexibility and expressive power. For example, quantification on 
situations is allowed. Fig. 6 shows the network description of the Situation concept, 
and of two particular types of situation, Above and Next-to. As shown in Fig. 6, every 
Situation has at least one object as participant. Next-to is described as a particular type 
of situation, with exactly two participants. To assert that an object O#l is by the side 
of a second object 0#2, an instance S#l of Next-to is generated, whose participants are 
O#l and 0#2. In other words, the following assertions are added: 
Next-to( %?I), 
participant(S#l, O#i), 
participant(S#l,0#2). 
The situation Above is described by means of two roles, is-above and is-below, both 
with exactly one filler. These roles are defined as particular differentiations of the role 
participant. 
5. Interpreting symbols on the conceptual space 
As pointed out in the previous section, the linguistic level provides a concise sym- 
bolic description of the perceived scene. Obviously, in the perception process this stage 
comes at the end, since it pertains to the most abstract representational evel of visual 
information. What we need at this point is a denomination function which maps struc- 
tures within the conceptual space onto linguistic constructs. A possible solution will be 
presented in the next section, and it will be related to the focus of attention mechanisms. 
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In order to define a denomination function correctly, we cannot avoid proceeding 
in the opposite direction; i.e., we need to introduce an internal, cognitively oriented 
semantic interpretation for the symbols at the linguistic level. In particular, we define a 
suitable interpretutionfunctian that maps the symbolic structures at the linguistic level 
onto entities in the conceptual space. This is a general methodological issue in artificial 
intelligence where it is normally assumed that there is a language that needs a semantics. 
By contrast, in the perspective of the vision context, the main problem is that there is a 
perceptual representation that needs a language. 
The proposed interpretation function @ associates any individual constant representing 
an object or a situation at the linguistic level with a perception cluster in CS, any concept 
(one-place predicate) with a set of perception clusters, any role (two-place predicate) 
with a set of pairs of perception clusters, and so on. Therefore, if C is the set of 
assertional individual constants and @’ is the interpretation function @ restricted to C, 
then Qc has the following type: 
&:C+PC (4) 
where PC represents the set of all perception clusters as defined in (3). As an ex- 
ample referring to the scene in Fig. 4, the interpretation function @ associates, among 
others, an instance of the concept Hummer with the perception cluster pet = {kt , kz}, 
where kt and k2 are the superquadrics representing the hammer head and the hammer 
handle: 
@(Hammer#l) = {kl, kz}. (5) 
The compositional aspects of the interpretation of symbolic structures at the linguistic 
level can be defined according to the usual model-theoretic semantics of terminological 
languages, as described by Nebel [50]. The main difference between the proposed 
semantics and the usual model-theoretic approach is that in our approach individual 
constants are not interpreted on unstructured set-theoretical entities (the elements of the 
domain). On the contrary, perception clusters are objects endowed with a rich internal 
structure. This fact involves relevant consequences. In the traditional model-theoretic 
approach the extension of primitive atomic predicates can be only assumed as given, 
and is, in a certain sense, completely arbitrary. In our approach, the extension of many 
primitive predicates can be determined on the basis of the structure of the entities in the 
semantic model itself. 
As a simple example, consider the has-part role of the Object concept. Given the 
assertion has-part(Hammer#l, Cylinder-shaped#l) in a purely extensional model- 
theoretic semantics, its truth is justified exclusively by the fact that the pair of the 
extensions of Harnmer#l and of Cylinder-shaped#l belongs to the extension of 
has-part: 
(@( Hammer#l) , @( Cylinder-shaped#l)) E @(has-part). (6) 
In the internal semantics, the truth of the previous assertion can be determined 
by examining the entities on which Harnmer#l and Cylinder-shaped#l are inter- 
preted in the conceptual space: the assertion is true if the set of knoxels on which 
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Cylinder-shaped#l is interpreted is a subset of the set of knoxels on which Hammer%1 
is interpreted: 
@( Cylinder-shaped#l) C @( Hammer#l) . (7) 
The assumption according to which the individual constants representing objects are 
interpreted onto perception clusters is a simplification made possible by the fact that 
we are dealing with static scenes. To characterize objects independently of position and 
orientation, the perception clusters would be properly parametrized with respect to some 
of its constituents, i.e., they must be projected onto suitable subspaces of the whole 
conceptual space. Similarly, in a dynamic context, the internal structure of the semantic 
entities can be articulated further, in order to justify, at the semantic level, the truth of 
other kinds of atomic sentences. Consider, for example, object categorization. A given 
object can be recognized as an instance of a concept Flexible-object if, in the set of 
the perception acts concerning it at different instants, the object itself underwent some 
kinds of deformation, i.e., if the shape factors or the length of axes varied within certain 
ranges. 
6. The focus of attention 
As mentioned in the introduction, a finite agent with bounded resources cannot carry 
out a one shot, exhaustive, and uniform analysis of a perceived scene within reasonable 
time constraints. Some aspects of a scene are more relevant than others, and it would be 
irrational to waste time and computational resources to detect true but useless details. 
This is a typical problem of traditional symbolic models: Doyle [ 271 and Cherniak [ 221 
stress the fact that, in order to avoid the proliferation of insignificant true conclusions, 
the aims and the purposes of an agent must be taken into account in the modeling of 
inferential activities. In modeling perception, these problems can be faced by taking into 
account the fundamental role of attentive phenomena in vision, as described in the work 
of Yarbus [67]. In the psychological literature, the focus of attention has sometimes 
been described as a spotlight which scans the visual field, individuating relevant aspects 
(see Posner [54] ). This mechanism is analogous to the scanning of a mental image, as 
described by Kosslyn [43]. 
Several models of focus of attention mechanisms have been proposed in the artifi- 
cial vision literature. An interest in some form of active processes during the recog- 
nition process is present in Marr’s work [47] as well. The early focus of attention 
models aimed at searching for a particular object in the scene, given a static model 
of the object. The basic purpose of an attentional mechanism is computational effi- 
ciency (see Ballard [7]). The subject has become a key point in the field of the 
active vision research; the interest in this argument has been summarized by Bajcsy 
and Campos [6] who propose the “active and exploratory” framework for perception. 
According to this framework, the perception process of a living or artificial organism is 
based on four characteristics: it is an active and flexible task, it must have exploratory 
capabilities, it is a selective process, and it must be able to learn from the environ- 
ment. 
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A strategy adopted by the active vision researcher in order to model the focus of 
attention mechanism aims mainly at choosing an optimal viewing position for the sen- 
sors, in order to improve the interpretation of the image and to minimize uncertainty. 
According to this strategy, Whaite and Ferrie [66] propose a probabilistic measure 
of the uncertainty of the superquadrics parameters, with respect to a general view 
position. The observation point is therefore changed in order to minimize this uncer- 
tainty. Maver and Bajcsy [49] propose a similar strategy for reasoning about occlu- 
sions, that takes into account the knowledge of the sensor geometry. They plan the 
next positions of the sensor in order to extract information from regions of missing 
data. 
Another well-used strategy to model the focus of attention (see Burt [ 211, Tsot- 
SOS, Culhane, Wai, Lai, Davis and Nuflo [ 641) is based on the pyramidal approach. 
Accordingly, the image is represented by a hierarchical data structure; “fine-to-coarse” 
algorithms generate the image measures, while “coarse-to-fine” search strategies are 
able to locate objects or situations in the scene. A high level control system drives the 
gathering mechanism. 
Other adopted strategies are based on Bayesian and causal models of the focus of 
attention. Rimey and Brown [ 561 propose TEA-l, a task oriented system that expends 
the minimum effort necessary for solving a specific task. The knowledge of the system 
is structured by Bayesian networks, while the control of action is carried out by a 
benefit-cost analysis. The system is able to answer to questions about table settings, 
such as “Is this a fancy or an informal meal?‘; the system activates the suitable visual 
actions controlling the focus of attention movements and the image processing tasks in 
order to answer the question. Birnbaum, Brand and Cooper [ 151 propose the BUSTER 
system, which is aimed at developing a causal explanation of the scene. The attention is 
driven by causal semantics in order to find the causal role of elements in the scene and 
the causal relationships among the elements. BUSTER codes in terms of rules a simple 
physical knowledge about static scenes made up of structure block stacks incorporating 
architraves, cantilevers and balanced structures. 
It is well known that at the lower, preattentive levels of visual perception there 
is a global parallel processing of visual information. The data received in input are 
concurrently processed, in order to produce a global reconstruction of the perceived 
scene. All data at this level have the same relevance, and no distinction is made between 
important and irrelevant information. According to Duncan and Humphreys [28], the 
goal of preattentive processing is a segmentation of the visual field into regions relevant 
from a purely perceptual point of view. At the attentive level, on the other hand, there 
is a sequential processing of visual information. From this point of view there is, in 
general, no “one shot” recognition of an object or of a scene; objects and scenes are, 
instead, recognized through a sequential exploration of the perceived image. 
In our architecture, the conceptual level described in the previous section acts as 
a “buffer interface” between subsymbolic and linguistic processing. The information 
coming up from the subsymbolic level has the effect of contemporarily activating an 
(eventually very large) set of knoxels in the conceptual space. It is the focus of attention 
mechanism that imposes a sequential order in the conceptual space according to which 
the linguistic expressions can be given their interpretation. 
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Fig. 7. A perception act related to the scene in Fig. 3; the perception act describes the hammer as a sequence 
of the hammer handle knoxel and the hammer head knoxel. 
In order to describe the focus of attention mechanism, we denote as CS* the set of 
all the possible sequences of elements belonging to CS, i.e., the set of all the possible 
sequences of knoxels: 
cs* = {k,,klk2,klk3,. . .}. 
We define a perception act p as a generic sequence of knoxels in the conceptual 
space: 
p E cs. 
Considering the scene in Fig. 3, a possible perception act may be: p1 = klk2. This 
perception act describes a way of perceiving the hammer as a sequence of its handle 
and its head (see Fig. 7). 
With reference to a perception cluster pc, we say that a perception act p is associated 
with the perception cluster pc if p E PC*, where pc” is the set of all sequences of 
knoxels belonging to pc. As an example, the previously introduced perception act p1 = 
kl k2 is associated with the perception cluster pcl = {kl, kg} describing the hammer. 
The perception acts associated to a perception cluster therefore correspond to specific 
ways of perceiving an object or situation described by the perception cluster. It should 
be noted that the sequence of knoxels that makes up a perception act may not include 
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all the knoxels of the corresponding perception cluster and/or it may include the same 
knoxels several times. In fact, the perception acts pq = ktk&t, or pcl = k2kl may also 
be considered as associated to the perception cluster pc. They correspond to other ways 
of perceiving the hammer present in the scene. 
We introduce a denomination function 0 associating perception acts with assertions 
at the linguistic level: 
0 : CS* -+ Assertion (10) 
where Assertion is the set of grounded well-formed assertional formulas. Given a percep- 
tion act p, O(p) is a grounded assertional formula in which a new assertional constant 
occurs, that denominates p. This new assertional constant is the “name” that the system 
associates with the perception act p. Block C in Fig. I implements the denomination 
function by means of suitable attractor neural networks, as described in the next section. 
According to the previous example, the denomination function maps the perception 
act pt = kl k2 related to the hammer, to the instance Hammer#l of the concept Hummer: 
O( kl k2) = Hammer(Hammer#l). (11) 
Analogous considerations can be made for concepts describing spatial situations, as 
Above and Next-to. 
Our proposal for the description of complex concepts in terms of sequences of knoxels 
is a way of dealing with attentional mechanisms in a well-founded manner, which 
naturally extends Gardenfors’ notion of conceptual space. It should be noted that the 
perception act assumption avoids the needs of augmenting the dimensions of the space 
in order to describe complex objects or situations made up by several blocks: complex 
objects can be described by perception acts of arbitrary length. 
In order to individuate the grouping paths among knoxels and to generate the most 
significant perception acts, it is necessary to orient the focus of attention in a suitable 
manner. In human beings, the focus of attention can be oriented either voluntarily, 
under the guidance of high level cognitive information and processes, or automatically, 
in dependence on particular stimuli present in the perceptive field, as described by 
Posner [ 541 and Jonides [ 401. We assume that the focus of attention is determined by 
three concurrent modes: the reactive, the linguistic and the associative mode. 
The reactive mode is the simplest one: the grouping paths among knoxels are deter- 
mined only by the characteristics of the visual stimulus, e.g., the volumetric extension 
of the forms, or the aggregation density of the perceived objects. As an example related 
to the previous scene, when the architecture is in reactive mode the focus of attention 
is directed to the hammer handle and to the hammer head because of their volumetric 
extension, thus generating the perception act pt = kl k2 (see Fig. 7). The knoxels related 
to this perception act are sent to the denomination block to find the corresponding lin- 
guistic constants at the linguistic level. The denomination block correctly denominates 
the input perception act as an instance of the Hammer concept. The assertions generated 
at the linguistic level describing the operation of the architecture in reactive mode are 
reported in Fig. 8. 
In the linguistic mode, the focus of attention is driven by the symbolic informa- 
tion explicitly represented at the linguistic level. Consider again the hammer example 
A. Clzella et al. /Artificial Intelligence 89 (1997) 73-11 I 91 
Knoxel (#kl) 
Knoxel (#k2) 
Cylinder-shaped(#kl) 
Box-shaped(#k2) 
Hammer(Hammer#l) 
has-part(Hmmer#l,#kl) 
has_part(Hammer#l,#k2) 
Fig. 8. The assertions generated at the linguistic level related to the perception act represented in Fig. 7 
Knoxel (#kl) 
Knoxel (#k2) 
Cylinder-shaped(#kl) 
Box-shaped(#k2) 
Hammer(Hammer#l) 
has-handle(Hammer#l,#kl) 
has-head(Hammer#l,#k2) 
Fig. 9. The assertions generated at the linguistic level related to the linguistic expectations for the perception 
act represented in Fig. 7. 
(Fig. 7). At the linguistic level a hammer is described as composed of a handle of 
cylindrical shape and a head of boxed shape. Let us suppose that the denomination 
block has recognized the knoxel corresponding to the cylinder shape. The description 
of a hammer at the linguistic level reports that it is made by a cylinder shaped head 
and a box shaped handle. The linguistic level therefore hypothesizes that the cylinder 
shaped knoxel may be, among other things, a filler for the role has-handle of the concept 
Hammer. The linguistic mode of the focus of attention now attempts the identification 
of the parts of the hammer, in particular its handle and its head, in order to verify the 
presence of such a hammer in the scene. This corresponds to finding the suitable fillers 
for the role parts of the object, i.e., a filler for the has-head role and a filler for the 
has-handle role. Therefore, whenever a possible hammer handle is recognized, the focus 
of attention tries to identify a hammer by identifying the possible fillers for its head 
and its handle. When some of the expectations concerning these knoxels are satisfied 
by some corresponding knoxels in the scene, the perception act made up by the knoxels 
that satisfy these conditions is sent to the denomination function in order to recognize 
the object or the situation, as in the reactive mode. It should be noted, however, that if 
the cylinder has been recognized, and there is no recognizable hammer head, i.e., the 
linguistic expectations are not satisfied, the architecture cannot recognize the hammer. 
Block D in Fig. 1 implements the linguistic expectation function by means of suitable 
attractor neural networks, as described in the next section. The assertions generated at 
the linguistic level related to the described example are reported in Fig. 9. 
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Fig. 10. The resulting perception act related to the previous scene when the focus of attention is driven by 
the associative expectation to find a ball and a mouse. 
In the associative mode of the focus of attention, the grouping paths are determined 
by an associative, purely Hebbian mechanism determining the attention on the basis 
of free associations between concepts. Whenever two objects in the same scene are 
perceived, the weight of the associative connection between the corresponding concepts 
is increased. So if hammers and balls have been always present in the same scene, the 
weight of the association between the concepts Hammer and Ball is strong, and they 
mutually activate each other. As a consequence, whenever a hammer is recognized, the 
focus of attention tries to identify some balls in the perceived scene, and vice versa. 
Let us suppose to have recognized the hammer by the linguistic mode (see the 
previous example). At the linguistic level, the concept Hummer is associated by a 
Hebbian mechanism to the concepts of Bull and Mouse, due to a previous learning 
phase. The linguistic level therefore hypothesizes the presence of these objects in the 
scene and the associative expectations block generates the corresponding hypotheses. 
As in the linguistic mode, when some of these expectations are satisfied by some 
corresponding knoxels in the scene, the perception act made up by the knoxels found to 
be so is sent to the denomination block. Fig. 10 shows the resulting perception act, while 
Fig. 11 shows the corresponding assertions generated at the linguistic level. Block E 
(Fig. 1) implements the associative expectations by means of attractor neural networks, 
just as for the linguistic expectations. The implementation will be described in the next 
section. 
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Knoxel (#kl) 
Knoxel (#k2) 
Knoxel (#k3) 
Knoxel (#k4) 
Cylinder-shaped(#kl) 
Box-shaped(#kZ) 
Hammer(Hammer#l) 
has-handle(Hammer#l,#kl) 
has-head(Hammer#l,#k2) 
Ball-shaped(#k3) 
Ball(Ball#l) 
has-part(Ball#l,#k3) 
Ellipsoid-shaped(#k4) 
Mouse(Mouse#l) 
has-part(Mouse#l,#k4) 
Fig. 11. The assertions generated at the linguistic level related to the associative expectations for the perception 
act represented in Fig. 10. 
Next-to(Next-to#l) 
participant(Next-to#l,Hammer#l) 
participant(Next-to#l,Ball#l) 
Fig. 12. The assertions generated at the linguistic level related to the spatial situations in the previous scene. 
The task of recognizing the perception acts in the case of spatial situations is similar 
to the task of recognizing the objects; Fig. 12 shows the assertions generated for the 
spatial concept Next-to (described in Section 5)) after the recognition steps of the objects 
present in the previous scene. In particular the assertions state that the hammer and the 
ball are side by side: the perception act obtained as the sequence of the knoxels of the 
hammer and the knoxel of the ball (kt kzks) has been recognized from the denomination 
block as a Next-to situation. 
It should be clarified that the distinction between the associative mode and the lin- 
guistic mode is a soft one: even the linguistic mode in some sense “associates” the 
perceived object with some expected objects. As it will be explained in the next sec- 
tion, both modes are implemented by attractor neural networks with suitable associative 
capabilities trained by a careful learning phase. The main difference between the two 
modes is that the associative mode captures all the free associations not described by 
the semantic network at the linguistic level, while the linguistic mode associations are 
driven by the conceptual description at the linguistic level. In the previous scene, for 
example, the neural networks responsible for the associative mode of the focus of atten- 
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Fig. 13. Another perception act related to the previous scene; the focus of attention is directed to the hammer 
head, the ball, and the hammer handle. 
tion have learned to associate a hammer to a ball, but they have not learned to associate 
the cylinder related to the hammer handle, to the box related to the hammer head, also 
if the two objects are always present in the same scene. This kind of associations is in 
fact managed by the linguistic mode. 
The main goal of the expectation generation process is to obtain the most exhaustive 
possible interpretation of the acquired scene by avoiding the generation of true but 
useless assertions. When the associative and linguistic expectations are not activated, 
the architecture describes the scene only by means of the simple reactive mode. In this 
case the architecture has no other choices than to build and denominate all the possible 
perception acts obtained by combining all the knoxels present in the scene. The reactive 
mode alone therefore generates a combinatorial exploding number of assertions, the most 
of which are true but uninformative. It should be noted, in fact, that the denomination 
of the objects strictly depends on the particular found knoxel sequence: when the input 
perception act contains the hammer head, the ball, and the hammer handle (Fig. 13)) the 
denomination block does not recognize the hammer, but it recognizes the three knoxels 
as three distinct objects: a cylinder, a ball and a box. The generated assertions (Fig. 14) 
are true but they do not describe the scene exhaustively. Furthermore, as the reactive 
mode has no access to the descriptions of objects of the terminological component, the 
architecture is not able to fill the roles for the parts of an object: e.g., the reactive mode 
is able to recognize the hammer (see the assertions in Fig. 8)) but it is not able to 
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Knoxel (#kl) 
Knoxel (#k2) 
Knoxel (#k3) 
Cylinder-shaped(#kl) 
Cylinder(Cylinder#l) 
has-part(Cylinder#l,#kl) 
Ball-shaped(#k3) 
Ball (Ball#l) 
has-part(Ball#l,#k3) 
Box-shaped(#k2) 
Box (Box#l) 
has-part (Box#l , #k2) 
Fig. 14. The assertions generated at the linguistic level related to the perception act represented in Fig. 13. 
recognize the cylinder shaped knoxel as the hammer handle and the box shaped knoxel 
as the hammer head. 
The denomination and attention mechanisms have been described up to now in isola- 
tion. As a matter of fact they operate concurrently by a simple recognition process cycle. 
The process is bootstrapped by the reactive mode of the focus of attention, which en- 
ables the denomination block to recognize objects “evident” in the scene: e.g., referring 
to Fig. 4, the reactive mode identified the hammer which is recognized by the denomi- 
nation block. This allows a balancing between the associative and the linguistic modes 
of the focus of attention to satisfy their own generated expectations. As a default, the 
architecture first tries sequentially to recognize the objects anticipated by the linguistic 
expectations, and then the objects anticipated by the associative expectations. However, 
it is possible to ignore one or both of them. When no expectations are satisfied, the 
recognition process restarts through the reactive mode of the focus of attention in search 
of a new and as yet unrecognized object. 
The focus of attention mechanism may be modeled as an expectation function P 
linking the linguistic to the conceptual level; the function has its domain in the set 
Assertion of assertional grounded well-formed formulas, and its range in the set of 
perception acts. Therefore the function ?P is of the following type: 
Pi : Assertion 4 CS*, where i = 1,2, ( 12) 
where CS*, as previously discussed, is the set of all perception acts; the index i indicates 
the attentive mode: 1 stands for the linguistic mode and 2 stands for the associative 
mode. The function P generates expectations on the perception acts to be found in the 
conceptual space, on the basis of the available assertional information. In other words, 
the focus of attention looks for specific perception acts belonging to the perception 
clusters corresponding to the “expected” assertional constant in the perceived scene. We 
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have chosen to model the attentive modes by the same function in order to reinforce the 
fact that the distinction between the associative mode and the linguistic mode is a soft 
one, and that they should be considered to be two faces of the same global attentive 
process. 
In the linguistic mode, the assertional constants are generated when the system makes 
linguistic inferences; as a consequence the focus of attention generates the perception 
acts made up by knoxel samples for these assertional constants. The system globally 
computes the expectation function by taking into account the information described in 
the terminological component. In terms of the previous example, when a cylinder shaped 
knoxel is found, the focus of attention searches for the fillers of the roles has-part of 
the Hummer concept, e.g., a filler for has-head and a filler for has-handle. Therefore the 
function P1 (Cylinder-shaped( k#l) ) generates perception acts made up of sample 
fillers of these roles. 
The associative mode is similar to the linguistic mode, except that the focus of 
attention searches for objects freely associated to the constants introduced at the 
linguistic level. In the hammer example, when a hammer is found, the function 
P*(Hammer(Hammer#l)) generates perception acts made up by samples of balls and 
mice. 
In the reactive mode, the focus of attention searches for generic objects in the scene. 
For the purpose of uniformity, this mode is considered a special case of the linguistic 
mode where the expected object is an instantiation of the most generic class, e.g., an 
Object. 
7. The connectionist implementation of the link between conceptual and linguistic 
levels 
A perception cluster, as described in Section 3, is a set of knoxels associated to an 
object or a situation: pc = {ki, k2,. . . , kl}. Each knoxel ki may be viewed as a point 
attractor of a suitable energy function associated to the whole perception cluster. In this 
way, a set of fixed point attractors models and generates the perception cluster: starting 
from an initial state representing a knoxel imposed, for instance, from the external 
input, the system state trajectory is attracted in turn to the nearest stored knoxel of the 
perception cluster. 
The implementation of a perception cluster by means of an attractor neural network 
(see Hopfield [38], Amit [ 3]), characterized by the corresponding energy function, 
appears to be a natural choice: each knoxel of the cluster is an activation pattern learned 
by the network. The implementation of the perception acts associated with a percep- 
tion cluster is built by means of time delayed connections that learn the corresponding 
temporal sequences of knoxels, as proposed by Kleinfeld [ 411 and by Kleinfeld and 
Sompolinsky [42]. This modification allows the attractor neural network both to recog- 
nize and to generate all the perception acts corresponding to a concept. Therefore, to 
implement the denomination and expectation functions mapping the conceptual onto the 
linguistic level (the blocks C, D and E of Fig. 1 ), each concept at the linguistic level 
is associated to a suitable attractor neural network. 
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The choice of time delay attractor neural networks offers several advantages. It is 
based on the well-studied energetic approach; the learning phase is fast, since it is 
performed at “one shot”. Furthermore, as it allows for a uniform treatment of both 
the recognition and the generation of perception acts, the denomination functions and 
the expectation functions introduced in the previous section may be implemented by a 
uniform neural network architecture design. 
For the sake of simplicity, we have adopted the binav unit version of the attractor 
neural network; the coding of the knoxels in terms of the binary activation pattern of 
the network has been computed by the coarse coding algorithm proposed by Hinton, 
McClelland and Rumelhart [ 371. 
The general expression of the energy function of an attractor neural network for a 
perception cluster is: 
nr Ill 
E~(r)=-~~~j~i(t)k;(t) withj # i 
i=l ,;=I 
(13) 
where m is the number of binary units of the network, T is the connection matrix 
storing the attractors representing the knoxels of the perception cluster, and k(t) is the 
knoxel representing the current activation pattern of the network. The number m of 
units depends on the number 1 of knoxels in the perception cluster according to the low 
memory load condition discussed in Amit [ 31: 
1-c Ly,m 
where LY, z 0.3. The connection matrix T is given by: 
(14) 
Cj = A & k,k, with j # i 
Cl 
(15) 
where k, is the vth knoxel of the perception cluster. 
In order to describe a perception act associated to the perception cluster, a sequential 
operation in the corresponding attractor neural network is implemented by introducing 
time delayed connections among units, These connections store the time sequence of 
knoxels in the perception act; the resulting energy term is: 
E2(t) =-~~~D$k;(t)kj(t-d7) with j f i (16) 
d=l i=l j=l 
where r is the time delay among two subsequent knoxels in the perception act p, s is 
the amplitude of the time window of interest, Dd is the delayed synapses connection 
matrix related to the time delay dr, k(t) and k( t - d7) are respectively the current and 
the past (d7) th knoxel of the perception act. 
The connection matrix Dd is given by: 
(17) 
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where kg and k(l+d) are respectively the 5th and the (5 + d) th knoxel of the current 
perception act; h is the length of the considered perception act. 
The global external input to the network is modeled by the energy term: 
E3(t) =-CCKjki(t)lj(t) withj z i 
;=I j=1 
(18) 
where F is the external input connection matrix, Z(t) is the actual activation pattern 
input of the network coming from the conceptual space. 
The connection matrix F is given by: 
Fi,j = k 5 k, L, with j # i 
Fl 
(19) 
where L, is the input corresponding to the knoxel k,. 
The global energy function is the sum of ( 13), ( 16) and ( 18): 
E(t) = EI (t) + AE2(t) + cE3(t) (20) 
where A and E are the weighting parameters of the time delayed synapses and the 
external input synapses, respectively. 
The expectation functions W’, corresponding to blocks D and E, are implemented by 
setting the parameters of the energy function E(t) to h > I and E = 0. In fact, the 
task of these blocks is to generate suitable knoxel sequences representing the expected 
perception acts for the input assertion. This choice of parameters allows the transitions 
among knoxels to occur “spontaneously” with no external input. Referring to (20), it 
can be shown that an attractor is stable for a significant long time period due to the 
El (t) term, so that the output knoxel is easily observed. As A > 1, the term A&(t) 
after some dr is able to destabilize the attractor and to carry the activation pattern of the 
network toward the following attractor of the sequence representing the next knoxel of 
the stored perception act. The neural network therefore visits in sequence all the knoxels 
of the stored perception act related to the input assertion. 
The denomination function 0, corresponding to the block C of Fig. 1, is implemented 
by setting the parameters of the energy function E(t) to h < 1 and E > 0. The task of 
this block is the recognition of input knoxel sequences representing the input perception 
acts. To accomplish this task it is necessary to consider the input term Es(t) in order 
to make the transitions among knoxels happen, as driven from the external input. When 
A < 1, the term /\E2 (t) is not able itself to drive the activation pattern transition among 
the knoxels of the perception act, but when the term eE3 ( t) is added, the contribution of 
both terms will make the transition happen. The neural network therefore recognizes the 
input perception act as it “resonates” with one of the perception acts previously stored 
and generates the corresponding assertion. 
To examine the operations of the neural networks employed, we adopt the %overlupk 
measure of performance (see Amit [ 3]), during network epochs, where an epoch is 
an activation cycle of the neural network. This measure of performance is defined with 
respect to a previously learned knoxel k as the time evolution of the overlap, in terms 
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Fig. 15. The diagrams of the %overlap versus epoch of the neural networks associated to the concepts (a) 
Hammer and (b) Ball when the input is the perception act of Fig. 7. 
of the normalized dot product, between the current knoxel output of the network k(t) 
and the previously learned knoxel k: 
(21) 
100 A. Chellu et al./Art@cial Intelligence 89 (1997) 73-1 II 
20 
epochs 
30 
Fig. 16. The diagram of the %overlap versus epochs measure of the neural network generating the linguistic 
expectations for the has-handle filler of the hammer. 
Let us consider the operation of the attractor neural network in the situation depicted 
in Fig. 7: the focus of attention is directed, by the reactive mode, to the hammer handle 
and the hammer head, and the knoxels related to this perception act are sent to the 
denomination block to generate the corresponding assertion at the linguistic level. Fig. 15 
shows the %overlup versus epochs measures of the neural networks associated with the 
concepts Hammer (Fig. 15 (a) ) and Bull (Fig. 15(b) ) . Each line of the diagrams shows 
the %overlup of the output activation pattern of the networks with respect to a previously 
learned knoxel, when the input is the perception act pl describing the hammer (Fig. 7). 
It should be noted that the sequence of input knoxels, representing the hammer handle 
and the hammer head, “resonates” with the previously learned sequence of knoxels s#l 
and s#3 of the network associated with the Hammer concept. On the other hand, the 
overlap of this sequence of knoxels with the sequences stored in the other network 
is low. Therefore the denomination block correctly denominates the input perception 
act as an instance of the Hammer, as described in the generated assertions reported 
in Fig. 8. 
Let us consider at this point the operation of the linguistic expectations block (block 
D of Fig. 1) during the example described in the previous section: a cylinder has been 
found and the linguistic level hypothesizes the presence of a hammer in the scene. 
The linguistic expectations block generates the hypothesized instances of the hammer 
head and of the hammer handle. Fig. 16 shows the %overlup versus epochs mea- 
sure of the neural network generating the possible expected knoxel instances of the 
has-handle filler of the hammer. As in the previous diagrams, each line shows the 
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%overlap of the output activation pattern of the network with respect to a previously 
learned knoxel. It should be noted that the network generates the knoxel hypotheses 
s#l, s#2 and s#6 as possible hammer handles. The knoxel s#4 does not belong to 
the hypotheses. After this step, the network generates the possible expected knoxel in- 
stances of the has-head fillers of the hammer. When some of these knoxels are satisfied 
by some knoxels in the scene, the resulting perception act is sent to the denomina- 
tion block to recognize an instance of the Hammer, thus generating the assertions 
in Fig. 9. 
The operation of the associative expectations block (block E of Fig. 1) in the exam- 
ple considered follows the same guidelines as the linguistic expectations block: at the 
linguistic level, the Hammer is associated, by a Hebbian mechanism, to the Bull and 
the Mouse, due to the previous learning phase. The attractor neural network generates 
the possible expected knoxel instances of the Ball and of the Mouse; at the end of the 
operation, the assertions of Fig. 11 are generated. 
8. Experimental setup 
This section describes the setup adopted to obtain the examples presented throughout 
the theoretical discussion, along with other more complex examples of the operation 
Fig. 17. The result of the segmentation phase. The regions found after the segmentation phase starting from 
Fig. 3 are set into relief. 
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Fig. 18. The depth map of the acquired scene obtained by the shape from the shading algorithm. 
Fig. 19. The voxel representation of the acquired scene 
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Fig. 20. A complex scene made up of a hammer, a cordless telephone, a wood block and a mouse. 
of the architecture. We have chosen an experimental framework that avoids some typi- 
cal complex problems encountered in 3D vision. Also in this essential framework, our 
architecture is able to draw interesting inferences and to build an interpretation con- 
text. The framework consists of static scenes made up of objects like hammers, tennis 
balls, computer mice and telephones; all the objects rest on a uniform visually contrast- 
ing planar backdrop. The objects are easy to segment and they are arranged in order 
to avoid occlusions. Sensory data are 2D images acquired by a video camera (two- 
dimensional arrays of pixels) representing an orthogonal view of the observed scene, as 
in Fig. 3. 
Starting from the acquired pictorial image, the subsymbolic level (see Fig. 1) com- 
putes the segmentation map by means of a region growing algorithm (see Zucker [ 681) : 
the image is initially partitioned into elementary regions of uniform brightness and the 
adjacent regions, for which the contrast difference is low, are merged. Fig. 17 shows 
the segmentation map found after the region growing phase starting from the scene in 
Fig. 3. The relative depth map is then computed by the Tsai and Shah shape from the 
shading algorithm [62] (see Fig. 18). We do not calculate the local orientation map. 
Both the depth map and the information about the segmented regions are fed as input 
to block B of Fig. 1. The first operation of this block is the volumetric representation 
of the input depth map by a spatial array. The result is a discrete representation of the 
spatial bulk of the objects present in the scene by VOX&, i.e., in terms of primitive 
volume elements (see Fig. 19). 
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Fig. 2 I. The superquadric reconstruction of the scene in Fig. 20 along with the focus of attention movements 
during the exploration of the scene. 
In order to describe the scene in terms of superquadric parameters, and therefore in 
terms of knoxels, each part of the scene that results from the region growing algorithm is 
approximated by means of the best fitting superquadric. The superquadric approximation 
operation is carried out by applying a simple two-step algorithm [ 41. First, the center 
pxrpY, pZ and the orientations of the principal axes 4, 8, and I) of the part under 
consideration are calculated, by determining the point and the unit vectors with respect 
to which all the products of inertia are zero, by following the algorithm proposed by 
Chien and Aggarwal [23]. Once the center and the principal axes are known, the 
computation of the lengths a,, a?, and a, of the axes of the superquadric approximating 
the considered part is trivial. In the second step, the form parameters (et, ~2) that best 
correspond to the squareness features of the object are obtained by minimizing the error 
function proposed by Solina and Bajcsy [57]. Since the center, orientation and axes 
are known quantities, the error function depends solely on the form parameters and has 
a minimum value that corresponds to those values defining the superquadric that best 
fits the given part. The approximation of each part therefore requires an optimization 
procedure in the two-dimensional space of the form parameters. Fig. 4 shows the results 
of the recovery of the superquadrics of the acquired scene of Fig. 3: each region of 
Fig. 17 has been approximated by a superquadric. 
Fig. 20 shows a more complex scene made up of a hammer, a cordless telephone, a 
wood block and a mouse. Fig. 21 shows the superquadric reconstruction of the same 
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Knoxel (#kl) 
Knoxel (#k2) 
Knoxel (#k3) 
Knoxel (#k4) 
Knoxel (#k5) 
Knoxel (#k6) 
Cylinder_shaped(#k2) 
Box-shaped(#kl) 
Hammer (Hammer#l) 
has-handle(Hammer#l,#k2) 
has-head(Hammer#l,#kl) 
Box-shaped(#k3) 
Block(Block#l) 
has-part(Block#l,#k3) 
Next-to(Next-to#l) 
participant(Next-to#l,Hammer#l) 
participant(Next-to#l,Block#l) 
Ellipsoid-shaped(#k4) 
Mouse(Mouse#l) 
has_part(Mouse#l,#k4) 
Above(Above#l) 
is-above(Above#l,Mouse#l) 
is-below(Above#l,Block#l) 
Parallelepiped_shaped(#k5) 
Thin-cylinder-shaped(#k6) 
Telephone(Telephone#l) 
has-body(Telephone#l,k#5) 
has_antenna(Telephone#l,#k6) 
Fig. 22. The assertions generated at the linguistic level related to the perception acts represented in Fig. 21. 
scene along with the focus of attention movements during the exploration of the scene. 
Fig. 22 shows the assertions generated at the linguistic level. By analyzing the focus 
of attention, it is possible to see that it follows two sequences: a sequence in which 
the attention is focused on the hammer, the block and the mouse, and another sequence 
in which the attention is focused on the body and the antenna of the telephone. The 
assertions generated at the linguistic level and the dynamics of the time delay neural 
networks may therefore be analyzed as a concatenation of these two sequences. It should 
be noted that basing the focus of attention mechanism on the expectations generation 
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Fig. 23. A complex scene made up of a screw, a cylinder, a square block and a rectangular block 
allows the creation of “attentional contexts” within which an object is analyzed. In fact, 
during the analysis of the first sequence, the telephone is ignored, because the object 
does not belong to the current attentional context. The same thing occurs during the 
second sequence: the block, the hammer and the mouse are ignored because they do 
not belong to the same attentional context of the telephone. This allows to avoid the 
“cognitive overload” problem. The architecture is able to discover the relevant paths, 
and aggregate the information in order to generate only those linguistic descriptions that 
are “useful” and “interesting” in the current attentional context. 
The scene represented in Fig. 23 demonstrates the same process: the screw and 
the cylinder make up the first context and the two blocks constitute the second. 
Fig. 24 shows the superquadric reconstruction of the scene along with the focus 
of attention movements, and Fig. 25 shows the assertions generated at the linguistic 
level. 
9. Discussion and conclusions 
The main goal of this work is to link together in a principled way two different 
research traditions: that of computer vision on one hand, and that of symbolic models 
of knowledge representation and reasoning on the other hand. We maintain that this 
goal can be achieved by taking into account the results obtained in different subfields 
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Fig. 24. The superquadric reconstruction of the scene in Fig. 23 along with the focus of attention 
duri ng the exploration of the scene. 
of t 
In I 
zognitive science. The architecture we have described is a first step in this 
particular, two main assumptions are critical for our proposal: 
direr :tion. 
(i> 
(ii) 
The existence of a conceptual level, intermediate between the lower vision level 
and the high level, symbolic representation. The conceptual level has a non- 
linguistic nature (it is independent of any linguistic formulation), and it is 
modeled in terms of a conceptual space. It is generated starting from the outputs 
of the vision module, and has the role of providing an interpretation for the 
symbols of the linguistic level. 
The link between the conceptual level and the linguistic representation is achieved 
through a focus of attention mechanism, that has the effect of scanning in a 
sequential way the information processed at the lower levels. This hypothesis 
stands on the widely shared psychological assumption, according to which lower 
level vision is based on massive parallel information processing, while high level 
attentive phenomena are of a sequential nature. 
1 mow 
Given these basic assumptions, the specific choices that have been made in working 
out the architecture make it very general. Obviously it can be adjusted easily enough to 
accomodate more specific choices. 
The architecture extends previous work on scene understanding [ 19,20,63] by pro- 
viding a cognitive framework in which to embed 3D reconstruction performed by current 
artificial vision architectures [ 11,241. It provides a well-founded interpretation mech- 
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Knoxel (#kl) 
Knoxel (#k2) 
Knoxel (#k3) 
Knoxel (#k4) 
Knoxel (#k5) 
Thin-cylinder_shaped(#k3) 
Flat-cylinder_shaped(#kk4) 
Screw(Screw#l) 
has-peg(Screw#l,#k3) 
has-head(Screw#l,#k4) 
Cylinder-shaped(#k2) 
Cylinder(Cylinder#l) 
has_part(Cylinder#l,#k2) 
Next-to(Next-to#l) 
participant(Next-to#l,Screw#l) 
participant(Next-to#l,Cylinder#l) 
Parallelepiped-shaped(#kl) 
Block(Block#l) 
has-part(Block#l,#kl > 
Box-shaped(#k5) 
Block(Block#2) 
has_part(Block#2,#k5 > 
Next-to(Next-to#2) 
participant(Next-to#2,Block#l) 
participant(Next-to#2,Block#2) 
Fig. 25. The assertions generated at the linguistic level related to the perception acts represented in Fig. 24. 
anism that builds a rich linguistic description of the perceived scene. This linguistic 
description may be considered as the ground level for complex symbolic spatial rea- 
soning activities, which up to now have been modeled without any reference to actual 
interaction with the external environment [44]. The proposed focus of attention mech- 
anism complements at the cognitive level the current work on active vision which is 
mainly modeled in reactive terms [ $61. 
It is clear that, at the present stage of development, our architecture does not directly 
address many of the presently unresolved problems of computer vision, although it 
may well provide a contribution in some of these areas. Typical problems encountered 
in real vision systems are: non-optimal image acquisition conditions, poor contrast, 
shadows, occlusions between objects, segmentation criteria. Nevertheless, our framework 
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offers interesting hints to face them. For example, the hypothesis generation process at 
the basis of the focus of attention mechanism can be usefully employed to solve the 
occlusion problem: the linguistic information and the associative mechanism can provide 
interpretation contexts and high level hypotheses that help in interpreting uncomplete 
structures. 
As a matter of fact, occlusions, non-optimal image acquisition and segmentation 
problems can be addressed in a framework in which active vision processes are coupled 
with our focus of attention mechanism. Symbolic reasoning and attentive processes 
driven by high level expectations can be essential in orienting low level active processes, 
in order to acquire new information from the sensors. The fusion of our model in an 
active vision framework is one of the topics of our future research. 
We are presently extending the architecture to the analysis of dynamic scenes. In 
this case, the subsymbolic level must be able to estimate the motion parameters of 
the objects in the scene (velocity, acceleration, and so on); the mapping between the 
conceptual level and the linguistic level must take the dynamic evolution into account; 
non-rigid objects must be recognized in spite of the modifications to their shape. We 
maintain that the assumptions at the basis of our model can be easily extended to the 
dynamic scenes. The focus of attention mechanism, and the concept of perception act 
are by nature dynamic: they introduce a dynamic aspect even into the perception of 
static scenes. Even more so, they are expected to work in dynamic contexts. 
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